Abstract: Foreign-acquired firms pay higher wages. The wage gap may arise with worker composition (e.g., sorting of high-quality workers) or firm-level premia (e.g., productivity improvements). We propose a dynamic decomposition on the Netherlands’ universal employer-employee data to understand the drivers of the post-acquisition wage gap. The wage gap rises from 1% to 5% after the acquisition, and firm level premia account for roughly three-quarters of the gap. The contribution of the workforce composition is initially absent, but grows to one-fifth of the wage gap, driven solely by new hires. Firm-level premia associate with higher management pay, worker training, and firms’ internationalization strategies. We show how the implied relative importance of worker sorting and firm-level development varies with assumptions on the counterfactual of the acquisition.
Abstract: Do workers in multinational enterprises (MNEs) build stronger CVs? We track the careers of all workers entering the Dutch labor market over the years 2006-2021 and find large, portable wage premia of MNE employment experience. Workers with experience at MNEs instead of domestic firms earn up to 14% higher wages within the MNE, and up to 11% higher wages after moving to another firm. Consistent with a model of MNEs that leverage their employment experience premia, we document that MNEs hire more juniors, pay lower starting wages, and are more selective in the employment of senior workers than domestic firms.
Abstract: We estimate the impact of automation on worker separations and wages across Multinationals (MNEs) and domestic firms within the matched employer-employee dataset of the Netherlands. In MNEs, spikes in automation costs lead to a 24% separation rate, with the remaining workforce experiencing 2% wage growth. Higher-educated workers, those with a background in ICT and Sciences, and managers gain 5-8% wage growth. In contrast, domestic firm automation spikes lead to a 11% separation rate, with remaining workers experiencing a 1.4% wage decline, mostly confined to lower-educated workers. The difference is not explained by flexible contracts in MNEs, exports, imports, or industry. Firm-level hires reduce in both types of firms. Additionally, we document that firms’ spikes in ICT investments raise MNE wage growth, while they lower wage growth in domestic firms. Machinery investments show no differential impact between MNEs and domestic firms.
Abstract: We ask three questions. First, do election systems differ in how they translate physical attractiveness of candidates into electoral success? Second, do political parties strategically exploit the “beauty premium” when deciding on which candidates to nominate, and, third, do elected MPs use their beauty premium to reap some independence from their party? Using the German election system that combines first-past-the-post election with party-list proportional representation, our results show that plurality elections provide more scope for translating physical attractiveness into electoral success than proportional representation. Whether political parties strategically use the beauty premium to optimize their electoral objectives is less clear. Physically attractive MPs, however, allow themselves to dissent more often, i.e. they vote more often against the party line than their less attractive peers.
